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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
JEFFREY NIEVES, #96-A-5573,
Petitioner,

for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2014-0297.56
INDEX # 2014-539
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

TINA STANFORD, Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of Jeffrey Nieves, verified on July 2, 2014 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on July 15, 2014. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the October 2013 determination denying
him discretionary parole release and directing that he be held for an additional 18
months. The Court issued an Order to Show Cause on July 25, 2014 and has received
and reviewed respondent’s Answer and Return, including in camera materials, verified
on October 14, 2014 and supported by the Letter Memorandum of Glen Francis
Michaels, Esq., Assistant Attorney General in Charge, dated October 14, 2014 as well
as by the Letter Memorandum of Dennis J. Lamb, Esq., Assistant Counsel, New York
State Board of Parole, dated October 7, 2014. The Court has also received and
reviewed Petitioner’s Affidavit in Reply to Respondent’s Verified Answer, sworn to on
October 28, 2014 and filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on November 4, 2014.
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On August 13, 1996, petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Kings County,
to an indeterminate sentence of 15 years to life upon his conviction of the crime of
Murder 2°. On October 10, 1996 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, New York
County, as a second felony offender, to an indeterminate sentence of 2½ to 5 years
upon his conviction of the crime of Attempted Robbery 2°. The New York County
sentencing court directed that its sentence run concurrently with respect to the
previously-imposed Kings County sentence. After having been denied discretionary
parole release on two prior occasions petitioner made his third appearance before a
Parole Board on October 2, 20131 . Following that appearance a decision was rendered
denying him discretionary parole release and directing he be held for an additional 18
months. The parole denial determination reads as follows:
“AFTER A REVIEW OF THE RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THE
PANEL HAS DETERMINED THAT IF RELEASED AT THIS TIME,
YOUR RELEASE WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE
OF SOCIETY AND WOULD SO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUS NATURE
OF THE CRIME AS TO UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.
THE BOARD HAS CONSIDERED YOUR INSTITUTIONAL
ADJUSTMENT INCLUDING DISCIPLINE AND PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION. REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN
CONSIDERED, INCLUDING YOUR RISK TO SOCIETY,
REHABILITATION EFFORTS, AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL
RE-ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY. YOUR RELEASE PLANS HAVE
ALSO BEEN CONSIDERED. MORE COMPELLING, HOWEVER, IS
YOUR PATTERN OF DANGEROUS BEHAVIOR WHICH INCLUDES
THREE FELONIES AND A PRIOR STATE TERM OF INCARCERATION.

1

Petitioner actually appeared before Parole Boards on three occasions prior to October 2, 2013.
Only two of those appearances, however, were regularly scheduled appearances (October 2009 initial
appearance and October 2011 reappearance). The third appearance (May 2013) was an appearance for de
novo parole release consideration apparently necessitated by a judicial determination vacating the parole
denial determination following petitioner’s October 2011 reappearance.

2 of 14

[* 3]

YOU WERE UNDER PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR A ROBBERYRELATED OFFENSE AT THE TIME OF THE I.O. [Instant Offense].
DURING THE INTERVIEW, YOU MINIMIZED YOUR ACTIONS
AND DID NOT GIVE A CREDIBLE EXPLANATION OF THE I.O.,
WHICH RESULTED IN YOU SHOOTING AN UNARMED VICTIM IN
THE BACK, CAUSING HIS DEATH. YOUR EXPRESSION OF THE
CRIME EXHIBITED A LACK OF FULL INSIGHT INTO YOUR
MOTIVATION FOR THIS HEINOUS CRIME.
THE BOARD NOTES THE POSITIVE LETTER SUBMITTED
FROM THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, YOUR WELL-PREPARED PAROLE
PACKET, LETTERS OF SUPPORT, GOOD WORK AS A PEER
EDUCATOR, AND OTHER POSITIVE PROGRAM
ACCOMPLISHMENTS.
THE BOARD ALSO RECOGNIZES GROWTH AND IMPROVED
ADJUSTMENT.
ALL FACTORS CONSIDERED, YOUR RELEASE AT THIS TIME
IS NOT APPROPRIATE.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the October 2013 parole
denial determination was received by the DOCCS Board of Parole Appeals Unit on
November 8, 2013.

The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings and

recommendation within the four month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c).
This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
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article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Hamilton v. New York State Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268,
Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908 and Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d 614. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
One portion of the petition is focused on the assertion that the parole denial
determination was improperly based solely on the nature of the crimes underlying
petitioner’s incarceration, as well as his prior criminal record, without adequate
consideration of other relevant statutory factors. A Parole Board, however, need not
assign equal weight to each statutory factor it is required to consider in connection with
a discretionary parole determination, nor is it required to expressly discuss each of those
factors in its written decision. See Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv granted 23 NY3d
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903, Valentino v. Evans, 92 AD3d 1054 and Martin v. New York State Division of Parole,
47 AD3d 1152. As noted by the Appellate Division, Third Department, the role of a court
reviewing a parole denial determination “. . . is not to assess whether the Board gave the
proper weight to the relevant factors, but only whether the Board followed the statutory
guidelines and rendered a determination that is supported, and not contradicted, by the
facts in the record. Nor could we effectively review the Board’s weighing process, given
that it is not required to state each factor that it considers, weigh each factor equally or
grant parole as a reward for exemplary institutional behavior.” Comfort v. New York State
Division of Parole, 68 AD3d 1295, 1296 (citations omitted).
In the case at bar, reviews of the Inmate Status Report (October 2013 Reappearance
Report) and transcript of petitioner’s October 2, 2013 Parole Board appearance reveal that
the Board had before it information with respect to the appropriate statutory factors,
including petitioner’s therapeutic/vocational programing records, COMPAS ReEntry Risk
Assessment Instrument, partial sentencing minutes, disciplinary record and release
plans/community support in addition to the circumstances of the crimes underlying
petitioner’s incarceration and his prior criminal record. The Court, moreover, finds
nothing in the hearing transcript to suggest that the Parole Board cut short petitioner’s
discussion of any relevant factor or otherwise prevented him from expressing clear and
complete responses to its inquiries. Indeed, before the October 2, 2013 Parole Board
appearance was concluded one of the presiding commissioners inquired of petitioner as
follows: “All right, sir, is there anything that we haven’t covered here today that you would
like to add?” Petitioner responded as follows: “Basically we went through everything, but
I have an issue with this crime particularly. Because like you said, it’s never going to go
5 of 14

[* 6]

. . . away, no matter if I stay here the rest of my life, or I’m home supervision. I have to
keep up what I’m doing and I have to find some type of forgiveness for what I did. This is
just the first step in my forgiveness, talking about my crime. So I have to realize that. And
I know this is forever. It weighs down hard on me and I’m just going to keep doing what
I got to do. Thank you for listening to me.”
In view of the above, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the Parole Board
failed to consider the relevant statutory factors. See Pearl v. New York State Division of
Parole, 25 AD3d 1058 and Zhang v. Travis, 10 AD3d 828. Since the requisite statutory
factors were considered, and given the narrow scope of judicial review of discretionary
parole denial determinations, the Court finds no basis to conclude that the denial
determination in this case was affected by irrationality boarding on impropriety as a result
of the emphasis placed by the Board on the nature of the crimes underlying petitioner’s
incarceration, committed while at liberty under parole supervision, as well as his prior
criminal record. See Thompson v. New York State Board of Parole, 120 AD3d 1518, Shark
v. New York State Division of Parole Chair, 110 AD3d 1134 lv denied 23 NY3d 933 and
Dalton v. Evans, 84 AD3d 1664.
Citing King v. New York State Division of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, aff’d 83 NY2d
788, petitioner specifically argues that in order to sustain a parole denial determination
“ . . . there must be a showing of some aggravating factors, and although the Nature of the
Crime needs to be considered, it should not be a determining factor.” (Emphasis in
original). In King the Appellate Division, First Department, not only determined that the
Parole Board improperly considered matters not within its purview (penal policy with
respect to convicted murders) but also that the Parole Board failed “ . . . to consider and
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fairly weigh all of the information available to them concerning petitioner that was relevant
under the statute, which clearly demonstrates his extraordinary rehabilitative
achievements and would appear to strongly militate in favor of granting parole.” Id at 433.
The appellate-level court in King went on to note that the only statutory criterion
referenced by the Board in the parole denial determination was the seriousness of the
crime underlying Mr. King’s incarceration (felony murder of an off-duty police officer
during the robbery of a fast food restaurant). According to the Appellate Division, First
Department, “[s]ince . . . the Legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se
should not preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances
beyond the inherent seriousness of the crime itself.” Id at 433.
This Court (Supreme Court, Franklin County) first notes that although the nature
of the crime underlying Mr. King’s incarceration was somewhat similar to the nature of the
crime underlying the incarceration of the petition in the case at bar, Mr. King had no prior
contacts with the law (id at 426) while the petitioner has multiple felony convictions and
committed the instant offense while at liberty under parole supervision. Petitioner’s
Parole Board was thus prompted to underscore his “PATTERN OF DANGEROUS
BEHAVIOR . . .” This distinguishing factor might, in and of itself, meet the First
Department’s requirement that a parole denial determination be supported by aggravating
circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the underlying crime. In any event,
however, in July of 2014 the Appellate Division, Third Department - whose precedent is
binding on this Court - effectively determined that the above-referenced “aggravating
circumstances” requirement enunciated by the First Department in King does not
represent the state of the law in the Third Department. See Hamilton v. New York State
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Division of Parole, 119 AD3d 1268. In Hamilton it was noted that the Third Department
“ . . . has repeatedly held - both recently and historically - that, so long as the [Parole]
Board considers the factors enumerated in the statute [Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A)] it
is ‘entitled . . . to place a greater emphasis on the gravity of [the] crime’ (Matter of
Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, 203 (2014), lv granted 23 NY3d 903 (2014) [internal
quotation marks and citations omitted]’ . . .” Id at 1271 (other citations omitted). After
favorably citing nine Third Department cases decided between 1977 and 2014, the
Hamilton court ended the string of cites as follows: “ . . . but see Matter of King v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 190 AD2d 423, 434 (1993), aff’d on other grounds 83 NY2d
788[2 ] (1994) [a First Department case holding, in conflict with our precedent, that the
Board [of Parole] may not deny discretionary release based solely on the nature of the
crime when the remaining statutory factors are considered only to be dismissed as not
outweighing the seriousness of the crime].” 119 AD3d 1268, 1272. The Hamilton court
continued as follows:
“Particularly relevant here, we have held that, even when a petitioner’s
institutional behavior and accomplishments are ‘exemplary,’ the Board may
place ‘particular emphasis’ on the violent nature or gravity of the crime in
denying parole, as long as the relevant statutory factors are considered
(Matter of Valderrama v. Travis, 19 AD3d at 905). In so holding we
explained that, despite [the Valderrama] petitioner’s admirable educational
and vocational accomplishments and positive prison disciplinary history,
‘[o]ur settled jurisprudence is that a parole determination made in

2

The Court of Appeals in King only referenced the fact that “ . . . one of the [Parole] Commissioners
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy, the historical
treatment of individuals convicted of murder, the death penalty, life imprisonment without parole, and the
consequences to society if those sentences are not in place. Consideration of such factors is not authorized
by Executive Law §259-i.” 83 NY2d 788, 791. The Court of Appeals, however, did not address that aspect
of the Appellate Division, First Department, decision in King holding that a parole denial determination
must be based upon a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent seriousness of the
underlying crime.
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accordance with the requirements of the statutory guidelines is not subject
to further judicial review unless it is affected by irrationality bordering on
impropriety’ (id. [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]). We
emphasize that this Court [Appellate Division, Third Department] has
repeatedly reached the same result, on the same basis, when reviewing
denials of parole to petitioners whom we recognized as having exemplary
records and as being compelling candidates for release.” 119 AD3d 1268,
1272 (additional citations omitted).
This Court therefore finds petitioner’s reliance on the decision of the Appellate Division,
First Department, in King to be misplaced.
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”3 To the extent petitioner

argues that the Parole Board failed to adopt rules or regulations implementing the
above-referenced amendment to Executive Law §259-c(4), the Court finds that the
promulgation of a certain October 5, 2011 memorandum from Andrea W. Evans, then
Chairwoman, New York State Board of Parole, satisfied the Parole Board’s obligations with
respect to the 2011 amendments to Executive Law §259-c(4). See Partee v. Evans, 117
AD3d 1258, lv denied 2014 NY Slip Op 82439, and Montane v. Evans, 116 AD3d 197, lv
granted 23 NY3d 903.

3

Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
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Petitioner also argues that the Parole Board improperly evaluated his risk
assessment in that he was scored as a low risk for committing a new violent felony offense,
for rearrest and/or for absconding.

This Court notes, however, that

although the

Appellate Division, Third Department, has determined that a risk and needs assessment
instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with post-September 30,
2011 parole release determinations (see Linares v. Evans, 112 AD3d 1056, Malerba v.
Evans, 109 AD3d 1067, lv denied 22 NY3d 858 and Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830),
there is nothing in such cases, or the amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), to
suggest that the quantified risk assessment determined through utilization of the risk and
needs assessment instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority of the
Parole Board to determine, based upon its consideration of the factors set forth in
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), whether or not an inmate should be released to parole
supervision. The “risk and need principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to the
amended version of Executive Law §259-c(4), while intended to measure the rehabilitation
of a prospective parolee as well as the likelihood that he/she would succeed under
community-based parole supervision, serve only to “ . . . assist members of the state board
of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
Executive Law §259-c(4)(emphasis added). Thus, while the Parole Board was required to
consider the COMPAS instrument when exercising its discretionary authority to determine
whether or not petitioner should be released from DOCCS custody to community-based
parole supervision, it was not bound by the quantified results of the COMPAS assessment
and was free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent assessment of the factors
set forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A) including, as here, the nature of the underlying
crime and prior criminal record. See Rivera v. New York State Division of Parole, 119
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AD3d 1107 and Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896, aff’d 117 AD3d 1258, lv denied 24 NY3d
901.

Petitioner also argues that DOCCS “ . . . staff failed to prepare a new Inmate Status
Report (ISR), and the Board relied on a [sic] ISR that was more than two years old . . . The
ISR that was used states that petitioner was interviewed on 8/22/13, however if he was,
then the erroneous information that petitioner had dependant children would not have
been in the report, because petitioner never had any children, although this was harmless,
still it [the ISR] lacked all the in-house positive accomplishments. Petitioner is a [sic] ever
changing role model for the inmate population, and that should have been recognized.”
(Reference to exhibit omitted).
A review of the record in this proceeding reveals that an ISR dated August 13, 2009
was prepared in anticipation of petitioner’s initial (October 2009) Parole Board
appearance. A second ISR, dated September 28, 2011, was prepared in anticipation of
petitioner’s October 2011 Parole Board reappearance. A third ISR, dated April 22, 2013
was prepared in anticipation of petitioner’s May 2013 de novo Parole Board reappearance.
Finally, a fourth ISR, dated September 24, 2013, was prepared in anticipation of
petitioner’s regular October 2013 Parole Board reappearance. Petitioner is thus incorrect
in his assertion that the Board relied upon an ISR that was more than two years old at the
time he was re-considered for discretionary parole release in October of 20134.

4

The Court finds no reference to any “dependant children” either the initial ISR dated August 13,
2009 or the ISR dated September 28, 2011, prepared in anticipation of petitioner’s October 2011 Parole
Board reappearance. In both of those earlier ISRs, under the heading “SUPERVISION NEEDS,” it was
simply stated that petitioner would need to work to support himself. The Court does note, however, that
in both the ISR dated April 22, 2013 and the ISR dated Septem ber 24, 2013, under the heading
“SUPERVISION NEEDS,” it is stated that “[s]ubject will need to work to support himself and his dependant
children.” The “dependant children” language, however, appears to be merely boilerplate language as there
is no reference anywhere else in the record with respect to any alleged “dependant children” of petitioner.
In any event, as noted by petitioner, any error in this regard is harmless.

11 of 14

[* 12]

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Court nevertheless examined petitioner’s
assertion that the relevant ISR(s) failed to reference all of his “in-house positive
accomplishments.” Under the “INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT” heading in the original
ISR dated August 13, 2009 the following was stated: “The subject was received into the
corrections system in 9/96. Over the course of time, he has successfully completed GED
studies, receiving his GED in 1997. In addition, he has participated in ART [Aggression
Replacement Training] Phase II of Transitional Services, and completed a vocational
Barber and Beauty Stylist Certification course. Work assignments have included several
months in facility barber shops, ground maintenance laborer, and porter positions. In
addition, Nieves has worked in food service, commissary, and administrative clerk
assignment, and laundry. Five months were also spent in a welding program. At that [sic]
time of interview, the subject was engage in ASAT [Alcohol and Substance Abuse
Treatment] and again assigned as a porter.”

Under the “INSTITUTIONAL

ADJUSTMENT” heading in the ISR dated September 28, 2011 it was noted that since his
last appearance petitioner “ . . . COMPLETED ASAT AND HAS HELD EMPLOYMENT
RELATED TITLES AS A PROGRAM AIDE, PORTER AND LAUNDRY OPERATOR.”
Under the same heading in the April 22, 2013 ISR it was stated that petitioner “ . . . had
completed the ASAT program and held titles related as a Program Aide, Porter and
Laundry Operator. Subject was not refusing any programing at that time.” Finally, in the
most recent September 24, 2014 ISR, again under the “INSTITUTIONAL ADJUSTMENT”
heading, it was stated that petitioner “ . . . is continuing to work as an IPA [Inmate
Program Associate] in Transitional Services.”

Under a separate heading in the

September 24, 2013 ISR it was noted that petitioner was interviewed on August 22, 2013
“ . . . and is requesting to make a statement at his hearing.”
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During the course of the October 2, 2013 Parole Board reappearance interview
there was significant discussion with respect to petitioner’s programing record as follows:
“Q [Parole Commissioner]:

Let’s now talk about your efforts
towards rehabilitation. Point out
to me-and I have a list of all your
programs you have done-they are
all in the file. I have also the
certificates of completion you
submitted in your parole packet
that I reviewed and you did a
nice job on your letter you wrote
to the board on your personal
statement, so we thank you for
that, for highlighting some of
your rehabilitative efforts in this
letter, also talking about your
background and the fact you
would like to take respondability
for this crime.
There’s also a letter from the
AIDS Counsel, there’s your
certificates of achievement in
here from the AIDS Counsel.
There’s also some of your
evaluations and peer trainer
evaluation, peer education
activity reports, and other things
you have done while you have
been in here.
What do you think is your most
significant achievement?

A [Petitioner]:

The HIV/STD peer educator, that
brought me out a lot, I like doing
that. I teach guys here ART and
classes everyday in the p.m. mod,
how to battle their aggression,
and I do HIV every week, I hold a
class for the guys to learn about
prevention.
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Q:

Okay, good. You are facilitating
ART?

A:

Yeah, I been doing that now for
about three years, two years.”

In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that whatever the shortcomings, if any, in the
various ISRs with respect to petitioner’s rehabilitation/programing record, there is simply
no basis to conclude that the October 2013 Parole Board did not have before it sufficient
information with respect to such record.
Finally, the Court finds that the October 2013 parole denial determination was
sufficiently detailed to inform petitioner of the reason(s) underlying the denial and to
facilitate judicial review thereof. See Ek v. Travis, 20 AD3d 667, app dismissed 5 NY3d
862.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

February 5, 2015 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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